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Alfredo Toro Carnevali
On October 22nd 2011, images of the murder of Muammar Kaddafi 
by rebel forces -posted on YouTube- reached the world stage. NATO’s 
Unified Protector Operation, authorized by the Security Council (see 
UN Document S/Res/1973, 17 March 2011) to protect civilians on the 
ground had gone beyond its mandate by toppling the Libyan govern-
ment. Though deeply concerned with the humanitarian situation in 
Libya, many Security Council members felt deceived by the way in 
which the operation had unfolded. In their view, they had not autho-
rized an operation to carry out a regime change in Libya. 
Since its adoption, Resolution 1973 had been received by important 
Member States of the Security Council with skepticism and suspicion. 
On 17 March 2011, Ambassador Viotti of Brazil, while explaining why 
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 her country had decided to abstain from voting on Resolution 1973, 
stated that she was “… not convinced that the use of force as provided 
for in paragraph 4 of the resolution will [would] lead to the realization 
of our common objective - the immediate end to violence and the pro-
tection of civilians.” Ambassador Viotti furthermore expressed concerns 
that “… such measures may have the unintended effect of exacerbating 
tensions on the ground and causing more harm than good to the very 
same civilians we are committed to protecting” (UN Document, S/
PV.6498, 17 March 2011, p. 6).
China, Russia, India and Germany also abstained from voting on Re-
solution 1973, citing a lack of information on the real situation on the 
ground and on how the Resolution would be implemented. Ambassador 
Churkin of Russia had been prescient in saying that: “If this comes to 
pass, then not only the civilian population of Libya but also the cause 
of upholding peace and security throughout the entire region of North 
Africa and the Middle East will suffer” (Ibid, p. 8).
As NATO led Operation Unified Protector unfolded it became evident 
that its objectives were not restricted to protecting civilians and achie-
ving a cease-fire among the warring factions in Libya, but included des-
troying the infrastructure and replacing the government of Muammar 
Kaddafi. As predicted by Brazil and Russia, the Operation exacerbated 
the precarious security and humanitarian situation both in Libya and 
in the Sahel region. 
As Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon reported  in January of 2012, “… 
large quantities of weapons and ammunition from Libyan stockpiles 
were smuggled into the Sahel region… rocket-propelled grenades, 
machine guns with anti-aircraft visors, automatic rifles, ammunition, 
grenades, explosives (Semtex), and light anti-aircraft artillery (light 
calibre bi-tubes) mounted on vehicles… surface-to-air-missiles and 
man-portable air defense systems…” (UN Document S/2012/42, 18 
January 2012, p. 10) The Secretary General further reported that these 
weapons had been smuggled by former fighters who had been in the 
regular Libyan army or mercenaries during the conflict, and warned 
that they could be sold to terrorist groups like Al-Qaida or criminal 
organizations like Boko-Haram (ibid, p. 11-12).
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A year later, in early 2013, heavily armed Tuaregs expelled from Libya 
-who had returned to their homeland-, would team up with jihadist 
groups such as Al Qaida, to topple the Government in Mali. This 
unleashed a new Security Council authorized intervention, this time 
in Mali (See UN Document S/RES/2085 of 20 December, 2012). The 
worst fears of countries like Russia and Brazil had indeed materialized. 
The implementation of RtoP under Resolution 1973 of the Security 
Council had, in the view of many, gone far beyond its call to protect the 
Libyan population, and had exacerbated insecurity in both the country 
and the region. If RtoP was to work effectively, it needed to be revised. 
It was in this light that Brazil introduced a new approach to the im-
plementation of RtoP, labeled: the Responsibility while Protecting. As 
has been duly explained in the chapter by Alex Bellamy of this volume, 
this new approach is meant to regulate and monitor the implementa-
tion of the third pillar of RtoP (see the use of force in UN Document 
A/63/677, 12 January 2009, page 22-28), while making those in charge 
of the execution accountable for their actions.
By all accounts, Brazil’s contribution has sparked a serious debate su-
rrounding the implementation of the third pillar of RtoP, both among 
States and civil society. It is understood to be an attempt to refashion 
RtoP as a more focused tool that would avoid repeating the mistakes 
of Libya. It seems to pursue the double objective of reinforcing the 
convictions of those who are already committed to RtoP and also to 
win over those who have remained skeptics of RtoP all along. 
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate whether Brazil’s the Respon-
sibility while Protecting, has been effective in achieving the second of 
these objectives: winning over the skeptics. Paramount among these 
skeptics has been the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, hereby referred 
to as Venezuela. 
Methodologically this paper will proceed to look into Venezuela’s 
position regarding RtoP before and after the introduction of Brazil’s 
Responsibility while Protecting. In this regard it will compare and con-
trast statements made by Venezuelan authorities in the framework of 
the United Nations from 2005 until 2013. 
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Venezuela’s Position Regarding RtoP, Before the 
Introduction of the Responsibility While Protecting
In 2005, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the World 
Summit Outcome Document. Paragraphs 138 and 139 of the Docu-
ment established a general working understanding of the Responsibi-
lity to Protect (RtoP). While recognizing the fundamental principles 
of equal sovereignty among States and non-interference in their 
internal affairs, it opened the possibility for the Security Council to 
intervene –under Chapter VII of the Charter– if a State manifestly 
failed to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing or crimes against humanity. Seven countries, among them 
Venezuela, opposed the inclusion of paragraphs 138 and 139 in the 
Outcome Document.  
In the 2005 Summit negotiations, President Hugo Chávez Frías of 
Venezuela had expressed deep concern regarding RtoP, stating: “…Oh 
do they threaten us with that pre-emptive war! And what about the 
“Responsibility to Protect” doctrine? We need to ask ourselves: Who 
is going to protect us? How are they going to protect us? (…) these 
are very dangerous concepts that shape imperialism, interventionism 
as they try to legalize the violation of national sovereignty.”  President 
Chávez had further added that the, “… full respect towards the prin-
ciples of International Law and the United Nations Charter must be, 
(…) the keystone for international relations in today’s world and the 
base for the new order we are currently proposing.” (http://www.un.org/
webcast/summit2005/statements.html, 2013).
Later that day, Venezuela’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ali Rodriguez 
Araque, would further delineate his country’s position regarding RtoP. 
Speaking before the General Assembly he denounced the lack of trans-
parency in the negotiation of the Summit’s Outcome Document and 
underscored his country’s fears about the potential political manipu-
lation of RtoP for political reasons. In line with the statement made 
by President Chávez, he asked: “Who is in a position to ´protect´ 
according to the terms of this document? Who is in a condition to send 
troops miles away from its country? Who has the financial resources, 
the armament and the logistics to undertake these actions to protect?” 
(UN Document, A/60/PV.8, September 16, p. 48)
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President Chavez and Minister Rodriguez Araque had struck at the 
cord of the Responsibility to Protect, that is: which countries where 
both willing and able to protect populations that where victims of 
the four crimes typified in the 2005 Outcome Document? The fact is 
that due to the world’s inaction in Rwanda many of the proponents 
of RtoP had intended to devise a doctrine that would compel major 
powers, the only ones capable of acting in faraway territories, to in-
tervene consistently in every situation where one of the four crimes 
-previously cited- where being committed (see The Responsibility to 
Protect, supplementary volume to the Report of the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2005).
What the promoters of RtoP seemed to have missed was that those 
countries with the capacity to mobilize great military contingents 
across oceans, had been doing so for centuries for purposes that had 
nothing to do with the protection of populations. Thus, it seemed 
inevitable that a group of countries, among them Venezuela, would 
become skeptic of the real motives of those major powers. 
Despite its strong criticism of RtoP, Venezuela’s position should not 
be construed as indifferent to the crimes typified in paragraph 139 of 
the 2005 Outcome Document. It must be pointed out that Venezue-
la is a signatory of the Convention on the Prevention and Sanction 
of the Crime of Genocide, all Geneva Conventions of 12 August, 
1949, and its additional protocols I and II, the Rome Statute and the 
Palermo Protocol, among others.  In fact, Venezuela’s representative 
before the United Nations, Jorge Valero, in a statement made on July 
24, 2009, at the General Assembly Debate on the Secretary General’s 
report on RtoP, asked the question: “Who can remain indifferent to 
such ignominious crimes as those which took place in Rwanda and 
other places of the world?” and went on to express that his country, 
“… condemned, without equivocation, the acts of genocide, crimes 
of war, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, regardless of 
who commits them” (UN Document, A/63/PV.99, 24 July 2009, p.4).
However, reflecting on the interventions made by a group of panelists 
that day, Ambassador Valero of Venezuela restated the skepticism 
previously expressed by President Chavez and Minister Rodriguez 
Araque about the real intentions of major powers. Valero argued that 
the panelists had put forward two different visions of RtoP:
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One, very enthusiastic, calls upon us to have faith and to forget 
the oppression exercised by stronger countries against weaker 
ones; the other one offers us an analysis based on irrefutable 
historical facts and invites us to reflect on the structural causes 
and the hegemonic imperial domination exercised throughout 
history, by imperial Western powers, as the elements determi-
ning the most grievous conflicts that humanity has suffered and 
suffers today (Ibid, p.4).
While reinforcing the position previously expressed by Venezuela’s 
highest authorities in 2005, Ambassador Valero went further in his 
statement by introducing a whole range of new questions on the im-
plementation of RtoP. Some went counter to the agreements reached 
in the 2005 Outcome Document by challenging the Security Council’s 
prerogative to decide when to intervene: “Will the 192 States that com-
prise this Organization have the same right to participate and classify a 
situation as an emergency [requiring intervention]?” The Venezuelan 
representative went on to answer his own question: “Some argue that 
the Security Council is the most adequate body to implement an 
armed or coercive action when the need arises to implement, as a last 
resort, the responsibility to protect. In this point my delegation wants 
to make clear our strong disagreement” (Ibid, p.5).
A second set of questions introduced by the Venezuelan representative, 
partly related to his country’s skepticism about the good intentions 
of Western powers, dealt with the potential political manipulation of 
RtoP. For example, he asked: “Who can guarantee that intervention will 
not be carried out for political reasons? (…) Who can guarantee that 
the ´ responsibility to protect´ cannot become a pretext for imperialistic 
countries to intervene, in weaker countries, for political motivations?” 
(Ibid, p. 5) These set of questions helped to reinforce the apparently 
ingrained distrust towards major Western powers, while introducing 
the idea of potential political manipulation.
An additional question introduced by Ambassador Valero of Vene-
zuela had to do with the possibility that RtoP would be implemented 
following double standards. Thus he asked: “Who can guarantee that 
there will not be a selective implementation of this approach [RtoP]? 
(Ibid, p. 5)
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All these questions could only lead towards a request for more time 
to study and reflect on the viability of RtoP, and so the Venezuelan 
representative asked for a, “… frank and good faith discussion of the 
‘Responsibility to Protect’ in the General Assembly”, as a way to move 
forward (Ibid, p.5). 
The position of the Venezuelan government on RtoP before the events 
in Libya unfolded, and before Brazil had introduced the concept of the 
Responsibility while Protecting, can be summarized as follows: 
First, there was a strong skepticism on the real motivations 
of Western powers to implement RtoP, including the fear of 
political manipulation. 
Second, there was a strong disagreement with the decision 
to bestow upon the Security Council the power to determine 
when a situation had reached the level of emergency requiring 
an intervention under RtoP. Additionally, there was a strong 
preference for a more democratic decision making process 
in the framework of the General Assembly.
Third, it feared that RtoP could be used selectively, by interve-
ning in some cases but not others, depending on the interests 
of the major powers.
Fourth, it expressed an interest in continuing to discuss the 
concept of RtoP in the framework of the General Assembly. 
The Introduction of the Responsibility While Protecting
On November 9, 2011, in the framework of an Open Debate of the 
Security Council on the Protection of Civilians, Ambassador Viotti 
of Brazil presented the concept of the Responsibility while Protecting 
(http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org, July 2013). As expressed be-
fore, this new concept, which was emerging in the midst of growing 
international frustration with the implementation of Security Coun-
cil resolution 1973 on the situation in Libya, was meant to regulate, 
monitor and make RtoP more accountable. A discussion of the new 
approach soon followed in the context of the United Nations. 
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In an informal debate in the United Nations chaired by Brazil’s Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, Antonio de Aguiar Patriota, on February 21st, 2012, 
participating Member States where asked to voice their opinion on 
the viability of the Responsibility while Protecting. 
The remarks made by Gert Rosenthal, Permanent Representative of 
Guatemala to the United Nations, in the context of the informal de-
bate, rightly captured the spirit of the Brazilian proposal. Referring to 
the Security Council’s intervention in Libya, he pointed out: 
For some countries, the execution of resolution 1973 (2011) has been 
traumatic, and it must be recognized that its implementation has poiso-
ned the environment regarding the ‘responsibility to protect’, to the point 
that it is compromising the important progress achieved regarding the 
acceptance and implementation between 2005 and the present (http://
www.responsibilitytoprotect.org, 2013).
The “traumatic” implementation of resolution 1973 (2011) on the 
situation on Libya seems, in fact, to have inspired Brazil –a Security 
Council Member during the time- to devise a new approach to RtoP. 
Yet, as Ambassador Rosenthal rightly suggested, Brazil’s proposal 
was not meant to restrain the development of RtoP, but to move it 
forward:
Far from pursuing substituting the original conception for 
something new, it builds on the that concept (…) Brazil is 
providing constructive ideas (…) its initiative (…) aims at a 
more nuanced and careful management of the responsibility to 
protect, but at no time does it back off from what was agreed 
in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 Summit Outcome Do-
cument (Ibid).
Brazil would most likely agree with Ambassador Rosenthal’s charac-
terization of the Responsibility while Protecting, as a way of moving 
RtoP forward, rather than a tactic to stall its path towards broader 
acceptance by UN Member States.
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Venezuela’s Position Regarding the Responsibility While 
Protecting 
The adoption of Security Council’s resolution 1973 on the situation 
on Libya seemed to have confirmed some of Venezuela’s worst fears 
on the implementation of the third pillar of RtoP. In his statement, 
in the framework of the informal debate chaired by Brazil’s Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, Antonio de Aguiar Patriota, on February 21st, 2012, 
Venezuela’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Jorge Valero, while 
recognizing the initiative promoted by the “brother country of Brazil”, 
went on to reiterate some of the same points made in his July 24, 2009 
statement:
…But who guarantees that there will not be a selective imple-
mentation of the ‘responsibility to protect’? (…) Why isn’t 
the ‘responsibility to protect’ mentioned when the Palestinians 
people are slaughtered? Why isn’t the ‘responsibility to protect’ 
mentioned when imperial powers assassinate, with impunity, 
Iraqis, Afghans, and Pakistanis? (…) Who guarantees that 
the ‘responsibility to protect’ will not be used as an excuse by 
imperial powers to conduct interventions in weaker countries, 
for political and economic reasons? (Ibid)
Venezuela continued to insist on the perils of the selective imple-
mentation of RtoP and its political manipulation by major powers. 
The Libyan experience had, to some degree, substance some of those 
criticisms. Venezuela might have felt emboldened to insist on its long 
held view that, “the mandate from the Final Document of the 2005 
World Summit is that the ‘General Assembly continues examining 
the responsibility to protect …” (Ibid). In Venezuela’s view, if the 
Responsibility while Protecting was to be considered, it would have to 
take place through intergovernmental negotiations in the framework 
of the General Assembly of the United Nations and with the partici-
pation of the 193 Members States. 
A year after the introduction of the Responsibility while Protecting, 
Venezuela’s skepticism regarding RtoP remained unchanged. In a 
statement dated September 5th 2012, Venezuela insisted that the 
events in Libya had fatally wounded RtoP:
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We should bear in mind that Resolution 1973 did not authorize 
the overthrow of Kaddafi, much less his murder. NATO went 
far beyond the mandate of the Security Council of the United 
Nations (…) The traits of good intentions and dignity that 
once could have been attributed to the ‘responsibility to protect’ 
have been muddled by the crimes and the media manipulation 
that occurred in Libya (http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org, 
2013) (translated by the author)
A year later, on 11 September 2013, in the framework of the informal 
interactive dialogue that takes place every year at the United Nations, 
the Venezuelan delegation insisted, once again, on the “establishment 
of an intergovernmental process within the General Assembly for this 
issue to be formally discussed”, while expressing its concern “that UN 
authorities may be moving ahead, using resources from the Organiza-
tion for implementing measures that have not been agreed by Member 
States” (http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org, 2013).
As Venezuela’s latest statements show, it is unlikely that it will fully 
engage in a debate on the Responsibility while Protecting, as long as 
the concept of RtoP is not fully reassessed through intergovernmental 
negotiations in the framework of the General Assembly. This leads 
to the conclusion that there has not been any substantive change 
in Venezuela’s official position regarding RtoP, as a consequence of 
Brazil´s introduction of the initiative: the responsibility while pro-
tecting.  
For Venezuela, RtoP remains a work in progress and intergovernmental 
negotiations are a prerequisite to reach a common basis for its imple-
mentation in the framework of the United Nations. 
If these negotiations were to take place, Venezuela would likely con-
tinue to contest the selective application of the third pillar of RtoP, 
including the impunity enjoyed by major powers, the risk of political 
manipulation, and the discriminatory decision making process when 
choosing when to intervene.  Merging these concerns with the precepts 
of the Responsibility while Protecting, is the challenge posed to those 
political and diplomatic entrepreneurs who want to make of RtoP a 
universal tool. 
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